SOLICITATION NOTICE
R -- Global Positioning System (GPS) Cybersecurity Support and Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)
- Notice Date
- 9/21/2016
- Notice Type
- Presolicitation
- NAICS
- 517919
— All Other Telecommunications
- Contracting Office
- Department of the Air Force, Air Force Space Command, SMC - Space and Missile Systems Center, 483 North Aviation Blvd, El Segundo, California, 90245-2808
- ZIP Code
- 90245-2808
- Solicitation Number
- 16-120
- Archive Date
- 10/21/2016
- Point of Contact
- Robert M. Chernoff, Phone: 3106539703, Amy E. Titcombe, Phone: 719-556-0643
- E-Mail Address
-
robert.chernoff@us.af.mil, amy.titcombe@us.af.mil
(robert.chernoff@us.af.mil, amy.titcombe@us.af.mil)
- Small Business Set-Aside
- N/A
- Description
- The purpose of this RFI is to conduct market research so the Government can firm-up its requirements and develop its acquisition strategy in support of Cybersecurity and Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) to enable protection, detection, response, and sustainment of the GPS Weapon System. Three primary segments of GPS work together to accomplish the GPS mission: The Space Segment (SS) of GPS satellites, the Operational Control Segment (OCS) of GPS ground-based command, control, and communications (C3) and signal monitoring assets, and the User Segment of GPS devices that receive the satellite Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) data. The Space Segment consists of all GPS space vehicles (SVs) currently in orbit: Block IIA, IIR, IIR-M, and Block IIF. A future block (i.e., the Block III SVs) is currently under development. The OCS commands and controls the SS to ensure it provides the users with the correct PNT information. The OCS is operated on a daily basis by Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 2nd Space Operations Squadron (2 SOPS) military and civilian personnel. The current OCS is comprised of three major elements: 1) the Master Control Station (MCS) and Alternate Master Control Station (AMCS); 2) four dedicated Ground Antennas (GA); and 3) six Monitor Stations (MS). The three major elements described above are networked together via DoD controlled IT hardware and software. This network (hardware and software) represents the OCS and composes the main objective for this RFI in obtaining support for Cybersecurity and DCO to enable protection, detection, response, and sustainment of the current GPS OCS. The MCS is located at Schriever Air Force Base (AFB) and is the center for all on-orbit GPS mission control operations. The AMCS is located at Vandenberg Tracking Station. The four GAs are located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) Florida, Ascension Island in the South Atlantic Ocean, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and Kwajalein Atoll in the mid-Pacific Ocean. The six MSs are located at Schriever AFB, Kaena Point in Hawaii, Ascension, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein and CCAFS, Florida. The MCS and AMCS are consolidated centers for the control and monitoring of the Space Segment. They are also the Command, Control and Communications (C3) centers for the OCS. Only one of the Control Stations can be in control of the constellation at any one time. In addition to the GAs, the OCS also has Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) connectivity to all Automated Remote Tracking Station (ARTS) sites that provide backup communication to GPS SVs. The GPS Cybersecurity and DCO support envisioned under this RFI is primarly focused on OCS but may expand to support operations across the GPS Space Vehicle (SV) fleet. This RFI also implements policies outlined in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 8530.01-M and DoD Cybersecurity Services Evaluator Scoring Metrics (ESM) v9.2. The contract is anticipated to be a fixed-price type contract. The Government requests respondents provide a recommendation of what specific type of fixed price contract the Government should utilize and a rationale thereof. The period of performance of this effort is anticipated to be at least 4 years in duration. The scope of GPS DCO support is separated into the following areas: •12.1 Architecture development support •12.1.1 Leverage existing efforts (e.g. DCO policy implementation) to support program office development of a standardized DCO framework for GPS •12.1.2 Produce GPS Architecture products on cybersecurity data flows/usage and transactions •12.1.3 Provide analysis and support for cybersecurity engineering and architecture for the operational GPS system •12.1.3.1 Recommend mechanisms to re-architect GPS to improve cyber resiliency •12.1.3.2 Recommend generational improvements to Information Technology (IT) systems used to support GPS •12.1.3.3 Recommend mitigations to cybersecurity and IT performance issues with GPS •12.2 Technical evaluation & assistance •12.2.1 Evaluate GPS assets against the DoD DCO framework and advanced cyber operations •12.2.2 Evaluate the existing environments with focus on current DCO tool suites, intrusion technologies and continuous defense monitoring •12.2.3 Analyze current and future Government Off-The Shelf (GOTS) and Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Operating System (OS) tools and equipment to enable GPS Command & Control (C2) systems to operate technology systems that are resilient to cyber threats. OS tools and equipment include, but are not limited to, Solaris, Windows, Oracle, and SPARC architecture •12.2.4 Analyze current and future OCS tools to enable DCO (detect, protect, respond, sustain) •12.2.5 Assist in development of metrics to monitor cybersecurity status •12.3 Defensive Cyberspace Operations Improvements •12.3.1 Develop a roadmap to rapidly migrate GPS to DCO-aligned operations for strong network defense •12.3.1.1 Monitor progress and take action to comply with applicable cybersecurity and DCO direction and policy •12.3.1.2 Support development of and update Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to conduct Defensive Cyber Operations on the GPS Control Segment. •12.3.1.3 Assist in the development of CONOPS and related policy documentation conducive to operation of GPS assets in a cyber contested environment •12.3.2 Support DCO structure development to include staffing, required skills, required capabilities, automation, and tools required to execute DCO on GPS networks in concert with 2 SOPS at Schriever Air Force Base (AFB). •12.3.2.1 Assist in enabling GPS to move from compliance-based risk management to data-driven risk management, providing GPS operators with information necessary to support risk response decisions, security status information, and ongoing insight into security control effectiveness •12.3.3 Support Defensive Cyber Protection Efforts (PROTECT): •12.3.3.1 P rovide support to the responsible organization conducting Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (VAA) activities including network discovery, network and host vulnerability scanning, intrusion/penetration testing, insider threat assessments, operational exercises, and compliance inspections to identify vulnerabilities and assess whether DODIN assets conform to specific security objectives •12.3.3.2 Provide support to the responsible organization conducting Vulnerability Management activities in order to maintain Information Technology (IT) asset inventory (hardware & software), patch & configuration management, security configuration compliance status, and implementation of cyber vulnerability task orders and alerts •12.3.3.3 Conduct vulnerability trend analysis from vulnerability scans and communicate trend analysis results to GPS leadership •12.3.3.4 Conduct Malware Protection activities including monitoring network and/or host-based security, malware incidents, and malware detection signature currency •12.3.3.5 Assess mission critical services and recommend Information Condition (INFOCON), Cyber Protection Condition (CPCON) level changes and resiliency methods •12.3.4 Support Defense Cyber Detection Efforts (DETECT): •12.3.4.1 Conduct 24/7 continuous monitoring operations to enable visibility of GPS network assets utilizing a combination of active and passive situational awareness tools at various levels in the GPS architecture •12.3.4.2 Monitor GPS for detection of cyber events/issues; report cyber security events and anomalies; correlate threat and vulnerability data to provide analysis and recommendations of actions to mitigate/remediate issues on affected systems •12.3.4.3 Maintain awareness of network traffic conditions, performance and bandwidth indicators, anomaly alerts, unauthorized activity, audit logs, and any on-going cyber event or incident •12.3.4.4 Present and deliver relevant intrusion analysis and correlation information to enable Government operations and sustainment decisions •12.3.4.5 Work with designated GPS Tier 2 (Regional/Theater) cybersecurity service provider to improve cybersecurity. This includes all levels, but are not limited to: monitoring, advising, integrating and implementing actions to mitigate cyber threats •12.3.4.6 Support cyber incident handling operations to minimize potential loss and destruction, mitigation of weaknesses that were exploited, and restoration of GPS services •12.3.4.7 Support warning intelligence/attack sensing and warning operations across GPS to maintain situational awareness and correlation of notifications/threat data from the intelligence community •12.3.4.8 Implement a proactive GPS cyber defense posture and conduct mission impact/remediation assessments based on threat data •12.3.4.9 Support development of countermeasures to respond to or mitigate cyber events •12.3.5 Support Defensive Cyber Response Efforts (RESPOND): •12.3.5.1 Analyze events, notify critical personnel, conduct mission impact assessments, report incidents and track progression, recommend countermeasures and monitor their effectiveness •12.3.5.2 Document forensic data and provide operations support to prevent further damage and coordinate response with GPS Leadership, GPS Operators, and GPS Tier 2 (Regional/Theater) cybersecurity provider •12.3.5.3 Prepare after action reports of cyber incidents, track open mitigation procedures, conduct trend analysis, and maintain a database of cyber events •12.3.6 Support Cyber Sustainment Efforts (SUSTAIN): •12.3.6.1 Provide recommendations for monitoring and improvement measures in order to sustain cybersecurity operations year-to-year •12.3.6.2 Provide recommendation on workforce plans to include scope of work, level of effort, position descriptions, functional roles and responsibilities, required security clearance, and training and certification requirements •12.4 Candidate Contract Deliverables •12.4.1 Weekly Cyber Threat Intel Report •12.4.2 DCO Charter •12.4.3 SOPs/TTPs •12.4.4 Weekly Packet Capture (PCAP) Analysis •12.4.5 Weekly Audit Data Analysis •12.4.6 Vulnerability Trend Analysis •12.4.7 Cyber Incident After Action Reports •12.4.8 Status Brief on summary of cyber activity and progress •12.4.9 Weekly Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Analysis reporting Please Note: Top Secret security clearances may be required Interested contractors are invited to submit a Statement of Capability (SOC) addressing their ability to satisfy the above requirements to SMC/GPK, Attn: Amy Titcombe at amy.titcombe@us.af.mil, located at 1050 E. Stewart Avenue, Bldg 2025, Peterson Air Force Base, CO 80914. Statements of Capability shall include the following information: Any information submitted in response to this synopsis is strictly voluntary. All responses are due no later than 4:00 pm MT, 06 October 2016 and must conform to 8.5 x 11-inch pages, font no smaller than 12-point, 1" margins and a maximum of 15 pages. SOC must be completely unclassified. All responsible sources may submit a SOC. Persons/entities debarred and/or suspended will not be considered and therefore are not requested to respond. Responses from small and/or disadvantaged business firms are highly encouraged. The NAICS code applicable to this Sources Sought posting is 517919 - Other Telecommunications. All Other Telecommunications: this US industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged in satellite terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Establishments providing Internet services or voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also included in this industry; size standard $32.5M. All data received in response to this synopsis that is marked or designated as corporate or proprietary information will be fully protected from release outside the Government. Respondents are advised that information submitted to the Government in response to this synopsis may be released to MITRE for review. Respondents shall either expressly consent to release of that information to MITRE, or clearly state their objection to release of that information to MITRE. The Government will not reimburse any cost associated with submitting information in response to this sources sought synopsis, nor shall any costs be allowed on any Government contract. Communicate questions/concerns regarding this acquisition to Amy Titcombe, Contract Specialist, (719) 556-0643 or Robert Chernoff, Contracting Officer, (310) 653‐3128 robert.chernoff@us.af.mil. An Ombudsman has been appointed to address concerns of offerors or potential offerors. The Ombudsman does not diminish the authority of the program manager or contracting officer, but communicates contractor concerns, issues, disagreements, and recommendations to the appropriate Government personnel. When requested, the Ombudsman shall maintain strict confidentiality as to the source of concern. The Ombudsman does not participate in the evaluation of proposals or in the source selection process. Matters of routine or administrative nature concerning this acquisition should not be addressed to the Ombudsman, but rather to the Contracting points of contact identified above. The Ombudsman is Ms. Olalani Kamakau, (310) 653‐1185, olalani.kamakau@us.af.mil.
- Web Link
-
FBO.gov Permalink
(https://www.fbo.gov/spg/USAF/AFSC/SMCSMSC/16-120/listing.html)
- Place of Performance
- Address: Peterson AFB, 1050 E. Stewart Avenue, Bldg 2025, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 80914, United States
- Zip Code: 80914
- Zip Code: 80914
- Record
- SN04281393-W 20160923/160921234751-3d69b085d4abd2a700e82ab989828c92 (fbodaily.com)
- Source
-
FedBizOpps Link to This Notice
(may not be valid after Archive Date)
| FSG Index | This Issue's Index | Today's FBO Daily Index Page |