SOURCES SOUGHT
A -- DHS DNDO RFI - RFI
- Notice Date
- 7/17/2015
- Notice Type
- Sources Sought
- NAICS
- 541712
— Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology)
- Contracting Office
- Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Washington, District of Columbia, 20528, United States
- ZIP Code
- 20528
- Solicitation Number
- HSHQDC-15-I-DNTAR2
- Archive Date
- 8/27/2015
- Point of Contact
- Terry Mincey, Phone: 2022547064
- E-Mail Address
-
terry.mincey@hq.dhs.gov
(terry.mincey@hq.dhs.gov)
- Small Business Set-Aside
- N/A
- Description
- RFI Word DOC Request For Information to Develop Understanding of Domain Awareness Research and Technologies Applicable to Wide Area Surveillance for Detection of Radiological/Nuclear Material Smuggling or Trafficking 1. PURPOSE The goal of this RFI is to seek information on emerging domain awareness research or technology that will assist in detecting radiological/nuclear (rad/nuc) threat objects being smuggled or trafficked at the non-Ports/Points of Entry (non-POE) border. The information needed pertains to emerging research and technology, the employment of which would allow detection of adversaries and adversarial signatures or activities that could identify or imply trafficking of radiological or nuclear threat materials, but that do not use the intrinsic radiological signatures of these materials. It is desired that the technologies would support wide-area sensing or surveillance applications in air, land-border, or maritime environments, the implementation of which would be able to increase encounter and detection likelihood of these trafficking activities by law enforcement. 2. BACKGROUND The Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) Directorate was established within Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to conduct, support, coordinate, and encourage an aggressive transformational program of Research and Development (R&D). This R&D should dramatically improve national capabilities to detect and report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device, Special Nuclear Material (SNM), or radiological materials outside of regulatory control. Priority is placed on R&D that has the greatest potential for addressing needs or weaknesses in the global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). TAR undertakes those efforts that dramatically improve performance and reduce technical, performance, and/or cost risks in achieving DNDO mission objectives. DNDO-TAR is preparing a technology roadmap in the area of rad/nuc domain awareness that will be used to drive future investment in technologies that could be used in support of the detection of radiological or nuclear material as part of the GNDA. Typically, radiological detection instrumentation is used in support of the rad/nuc interdiction mission; however, this instrumentation tends to be static and deployed at official Points and Ports of Entry (POEs). While it is desirable to be able to detect rad/nuc threats at the non-POE border, the difficulty of complete coverage of wide geographic areas associated with non-POE borders is well-understood. Instead, approaches are sought that would enable and enhance encounter likelihood in these environments, employing emerging research or technology that could support wide-area surveillance and detect potential indicators of rad/nuc movement or smuggling. Example targets, signals or signatures that might be considered include the presence of larger amounts of high density materials that could shield radiation emitted from radioactive materials hidden inside, the presence of guns or other weapons to defend these materials, or other signatures that may be defined by the responder. The surveillance/detection research or technology could be an individual sensor or a system of multiple sensors integrated into a single system. Signatures for consideration include: 1. Guns/weapons - This signature was chosen because of the nature of the adversary crossing the border with a threat object. It is predicted, due to the scarcity of rad/nuc material that an adversary would fight in order to evade capture. Weapons are likely to be carried in order to protect an adversary's smuggled material. 2. Presence of shielding - This signature was chosen because shielding is a potential direct adversary tactic for evading detection and providing safe conveyance for rad/nuc material. It should be noted that there is a body of research on approaches for gravity wave detection currently being pursued. Research in other signatures and techniques are sought that will support wide area, long range detection of shielding. 3. Detection of passive and active communication devices/electronics - Adversaries that are smuggling rad/nuc materials may use different communication and navigation tools such that the smugglers can be in contact with a larger organization. The presence of satellite phones or other types of tracking devices may separate out economic migrants from high-value nuclear materials smugglers. 4. Detection of high value conveyances (e.g. submersibles) - High value conveyances that have the ability to evade optical detection such as traveling underwater could be used to smuggle high-value goods into the country. Due to the success of such tactics, adversaries wanting to smuggle in rad/nuc material or devices may be motivated to use these types of conveyances. 5. Detection of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with emphasis at low altitude - UAVs have become more powerful over the past decade and have the ability to carry hundreds of pounds. Use of UAVs may again be associated with either the shipment of a small volume of rad/nuc materials or to provide oversight of maritime or ground smuggling activities. Also sought are analysis tools to enable the detection of potential signals and signatures of rad/nuc smuggling, as well to fill intelligence gaps and support intelligence analyses. Developing analysis tools to fill intelligence gaps such as new information tagging systems can have a direct impact on domain awareness. 3. REQUIREMENTS This RFI is primarily interested in the identification of novel research, emerging technologies and potential signatures that would drive further action based on suspicion that an individual or vehicle may be smuggling rad/nuc material between official US ports of entry. The detection of the ionizing radiation itself from these materials is outside of the scope of this request - it must be detection of other signatures that is proposed. The response may include discovery of novel signatures, or current research and emerging technology (or multiple technologies) may be able to detect the particular signature of interest. The research or technology ideally should be extensible to cover wide geographical areas with the goal that the entire border could be covered by a relatively small number (10s) of devices or the cost of the device is sufficiently low that large numbers are operationally cost effective. It is not required that the devices be static or for an entire geographic region to be surveilled by a technology at all times. Solutions suitable for some or all of the following conditions are of interest: • Day or night (24 hours) • Inclement weather (rain, snow, fog) Technologies must perform in real-time. These capabilities could include significant advancements or new applications of commercial technologies (such as electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging, LIDAR, and radar) or new technologies that provide new or better information streams. It is expected that data communications and fusion between the physically disparate system components will be necessary to achieve required system performance. This RFI is in support of the development of a technological roadmap in the area of domain awareness for the rad/nuc threat by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in support of TAR. As such, any responses to this RFI may be shared with SNL. 4. QUESTIONS/INFORMATION SOUGHT 1. What signatures may be unique to rad/nuc smuggling or trafficking operations that if detected, could enable encounter likelihood by law enforcements assets? What can be sensed or identified and why is it important to this mission? 2. What commercial or government off-the-shelf, or near off-the-shelf technology exists that would support detection of these signatures of rad/nuc smuggling at-a-distance and over a wide area? What is its expected performance? 3. What novel research or emerging technology exists that would support detection of these signatures of rad/nuc smuggling at a distance and over a wide area? What is the current maturity of this research/technology, and what is the anticipated capability and performance that could be achieved when it is fully mature? How would the mature capability likely be employed to achieve best performance? What is its potential performance in terms of its accuracy, precision, range, and reliability for detection and tracking? What companies and/or organizations are developing these technologies? Has a prototype or full system been developed? What other technologies, COTS or in development, would support the information stream from these technologies? 4. What are state-of-the-art algorithmic approaches and analyses for integration of different types of technologies and the information they provide, the combination of which would most effectively detect rad/nuc smuggling activities at or near the non-POE border? 5. CONDITIONS OF RFI THIS IS A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) ONLY. This RFI is issued solely for information and planning purposes; it does not constitute a Request for Proposal (RFP) or a promise to issue an RFP or Broad Area Announcement (BAA). This RFI does not commit the Government to contract for any supply or service. DHS DNDO is not at this time seeking proposals. Responders are advised that the U.S. Government will not pay any cost incurred in response to this RFI. All costs associated with responding to this RFI will be solely at the responding party's expense. The information provided in this RFI is subject to change and is not binding on the Government. All submissions become the property of the Federal Government and will not be returned. The following provision(s) is applicable to this notice and is hereby incorporated by reference: FAR 52.215-3 Request for Information or Solicitation for Planning Purposes (Oct 1997). The full text of this clause is available at: http://www.acquisition.gov/far/ 6. DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION Interested parties are requested to respond to this RFI with responses to any or all of the questions and information sought in Section 4. Responses should be concise and be specific to the questions indicated. Responses should not exceed three (3) pages and must be submitted in.pdf format. Responders are encouraged to avoid use of excessive marketing lexicon, submission of fancy brochures and other unnecessary sales literature, and product puffery. The complete package will be submitted via e-mail to: dndoerp@hq.dhs.gov Submissions are due no later than 4:30 PM (Eastern Time) on August 12, 2015. Please contact the above for instructions on submitting any responses that may be classified. Those who respond to this RFI should not anticipate feedback with regards to their submission other than acknowledgment of receipt - IF a request for an acknowledgement is requested by the submitter. DHS reserves the right to review late submissions but makes no guarantee to the order of or possibility for review of late submissions. Proprietary information, if any, should be minimized and MUST BE CLEARLY MARKED. To aid DHS, please segregate proprietary information. Please be advised that all submissions become the property of the Federal Government, and will not be returned.
- Web Link
-
FBO.gov Permalink
(https://www.fbo.gov/spg/DHS/OCPO/DHS-OCPO/HSHQDC-15-I-DNTAR2/listing.html)
- Place of Performance
- Address: National Capital Region Washington DC, Washington, District of Columbia, 20005, United States
- Zip Code: 20005
- Zip Code: 20005
- Record
- SN03800966-W 20150719/150717234658-a2830d08ae8acccc8da3c958968a4cee (fbodaily.com)
- Source
-
FedBizOpps Link to This Notice
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